Posts com a Tag ‘STUENKEL Oliver (Res)’
Hajari, as fúrias da meia-noite de Nisid: o legado mortal da partição da Índia | Oliver Stuenkel
A partição, a divisão do subcontinente indiano em dois países em 1947, sempre será lembrada como uma das maiores tragédias do século XX, envolvendo uma das maiores migrações humanas forçadas da história, deslocando mais de 10 milhões de pessoas. Isso levou a mais de um milhão de mortes no contexto da saída da Grã-Bretanha do subcontinente e da independência da Índia e do Paquistão. Finalmente, foi o capítulo de abertura de uma das rivalidades mais complexas e não resolvidas do mundo, produzindo um hot spot nuclear que muitos consideram o mais perigoso do mundo. Nisid Hajari escreveu um livro muito legível sobre a política da Partição, detalhando as negociações e dinâmica de energia na véspera de 15 de agosto de 1947.
Com habilidade jornalística, o autor fornece retratos íntimos dos personagens principais do livro, Jawaharlal Nehru e Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel (Sardar) e Lord Louis Mountbatten também aparecem com frequência, mas Hajari descreve essencialmente o drama da Partition como um show de dois homens.
Enquanto Hajari se destaca em transformar um evento complexo e pesado em um virador de páginas, sua conta é centrada na Índia e, no final das contas, muito tendenciosa às visões de Nehru para fornecer uma conta equilibrada. O primeiro primeiro-ministro da Índia, o leitor é informado nas primeiras páginas do livro, era “arrojado”, “famoso por algumas das mãos”, tinha “maçãs do rosto aristocráticas e olhos altos que eram piscinas profundas – irresistíveis para suas muitas admiradoras”. “Apesar de desdenhoso das superficialidades, ele cuidou muito da aparência”, maravilha-se o autor. Ao longo do livro, Hajari descreve as qualidades supostamente sobre-humanas de Nehru, por exemplo, quando ele oferece o risco de sua vida para proteger os muçulmanos em Old Delhi. Jinnah, por outro lado, é amplamente descrito como um bandido sedento de poder que carecia de princípios “irascível” e ”
Nehru, o autor admite, também tinha falhas. Como escreve Hajari, Nehru se recusou a aceitar a Liga Muçulmana como parceiro da coalizão em 1937, exceto em termos humilhantes que incluíam a fusão incondicional dos partidos parlamentares da Liga Muçulmana no Congresso. O comportamento arrogante e distante de Nehru era precisamente o que Jinnah precisava para fortalecer as ansiedades que os muçulmanos tinham em relação à Índia dominada pela maioria hindu. E, no entanto, o livro deixa poucas dúvidas sobre quem é o vilão da história.
O que talvez seja mais problemático com esse relato é que a idéia de criar o Paquistão é descrita como pouco mais do que uma manobra usada por Jinnah para retomar sua carreira política após o retorno de Gandhi da África do Sul e a ascensão do povo hindu. O congresso o empurrou para a margem. Depois que sua jovem esposa se suicida, Jinnah se muda para uma casa sombria com sua irmã do mal, Fátima. Enquanto Nehru é movido por altos ideais, sugere o livro, Jinnah é movido pela amargura e pelo desejo de vingança.
No entanto, a idéia do Paquistão era muito mais do que um mero argumento de barganha proposto por Jinnah. Hajari permanece calado sobre figuras-chave como Muhammad Iqbal, uma das figuras mais importantes da literatura urdu e o filósofo que inspirou o Movimento Paquistanês. O autor parece sugerir que seria necessário apenas um representante mais moderado da Liga Muçulmana para evitar a Partição.
Contudo, esse argumento ignora que as eleições supervisionadas pelos britânicos em 1937 e 1946, que o Congresso dominado pelos hindus venceu com facilidade, apenas endureceram a identidade muçulmana e tornaram inevitável a divisão. A política britânica de definir comunidades com base na identidade religiosa, que alterou fundamentalmente a autopercepção indiana, requer muito mais atenção para explicar a dinâmica que levou à Partição. Churchill, em particular, viu consolidar uma identidade muçulmana na Índia e alimentar tensões sectárias como essenciais para prolongar o domínio britânico no subcontinente (ele apoiou ativamente a causa de Jinnah nos anos anteriores a 1947).
Hajari reconhece que a decisão de Mountbatten de antecipar a retirada da Grã-Bretanha e deixar um cartógrafo despreparado traçar as fronteiras dentro de 40 dias (sem visitar as regiões afetadas, como o autor nota corretamente) tornou todo o projeto muito mais mortal do que poderia ter sido em outras circunstâncias . Jinnah dificilmente poderia ter antecipado tal comportamento irresponsável pelos britânicos.
Como escreve Pankaj ( Mishra, 2007 ), ninguém havia se preparado para uma transferência massiva de população. Mesmo quando milícias armadas vagavam pelo campo, procurando pessoas para sequestrar, estuprar e matar, casas para saquear e trens para descarrilar e queimar, a única força capaz de restaurar a ordem, o Exército Indiano Britânico, estava sendo dividida em linhas religiosas – soldados muçulmanos no Paquistão, hindus na Índia. Em breve, muitos dos soldados comunalizados se uniriam a seus co-religiosos na matança de facções, dando à violência a partição de seu elenco genocida … Os soldados britânicos confinados em seus quartéis, ordenados por Montana para salvar apenas vidas britânicas, podem provar ser a imagem mais duradoura do retiro imperial.
As Fúrias da meia-noite não descobrem muitas fontes novas e os especialistas não encontrarão nada que mude de opinião, mas o livro é bem pesquisado. Uma exceção um tanto estranha é a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), uma organização hindu de direita, que Hajari abrevia erroneamente como RSSS ao longo do livro.
Apesar de seu viés, o livro aponta para a importância de um ponto de virada histórico crucial que continua a moldar os atuais debates geopolíticos. Como a disciplina de Relações Internacionais, em particular, continua se concentrando demais no que aconteceu na Europa após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, são necessários muitos outros livros sobre as consequências da guerra na Ásia e em outras partes do mundo.
Referências
Mishra, Pankaj. Feridas de saída: o legado da partição indiana. 13 de agosto de 2007. Disponível em: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/08/13/exit-wounds ; Acesso em: 12 jan. 2016. [ Links ]
Oliver Stuenkel – Professor Assistente de Relações Internacionais, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV). São Paulo, SP, Brasil. E-mail: oliver.stuenkel@fgv.br.
STUENKEL, Oliver. Hajari, as fúrias da meia-noite de Nisid: o legado mortal da partição da Índia. Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. 328p. Resenha de: STUENKEL, Oliver. Revista Brasileira de História. São Paulo, v.36, n.71 São Paulo, jan./abr. 2016.
Liberal Internationalism: Theory/History/Practice | Beate Jahn
‘Liberalism’ is famously difficult to define in politics around the world. In the United States, liberals are center-left, akin to social democrats in Germany. Similarly, in Sweden, the Liberal People’s Party supports social liberalism and has a strong ideological commitment to a mixed economy, with support for comprehensive but market-based welfare state programs. In Germany, liberals are nowadays thought to be center-right, and usually allies of the conservative party, even though they have worked with the social democrats in the past. In Brazil, the term ‘liberal’ is reserved for laissez-faire, right-wing libertarians. The term is so unpopular that political parties whose name included the term ‘liberal’ changed their name. When I decided to offer a post-graduate seminar called “The History of Liberal Internationalism”, a colleague suggested I change the name to “Liberal Internationalism and its Critics” to avoid running the risk of being called a liberal. International discussions about liberalism, in short, are bound to lead to confusion.
In the same way ‘Liberal internationalism’ is perhaps one of the most misunderstood theoretical strands in international relations. For some, it is best represented by liberal thinkers such as Harvard’s Michael Ignatieff, Princeton’s G. John Ikenberry and the New America Foundation’s Anne-Marie Slaughter, who see themselves as ‘Wilsonians’. Others -both in the United States and abroad- regard liberal internationalism as a dangerous school of thought which has provoked disasters such as the 2003 ‘missionary’ intervention in Iraq. Thinkers in the Global South tend to agree with the latter assessment. (The debate about whether Bush was a Wilsonian is best summarized in “The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the 21st Century”). At other times, the term is used more broadly to describe the application of liberal principles and practices to international politics, and sometimes simply the foreign policies of liberal states. Leia Mais
China Goes Global: The Partial Power | DAvid Shambaugh
Today’s debate about the future of global order is marked by a near-certainty that China’s economy will overtake that of the United States within the next decade. Most analysts also believe that as a consequence, China will be able to challenge and eventually supplant the US as the global hegemon. We are heading, the story goes, towards a ‘Chinese world’.
David Shambaugh, Director of the China Program at George Washington University, disagrees. He argues that China “has a very long way to go before it becomes – if it ever becomes – a true global power.” According to him, “China will never rule the world.” The reason, according to the author, is not merely economic. The book argues that China lacks close friends or allies, and that China is not normatively integrated into the community of nations. It lacks a military network similar to that of the United States. Furthermore, its reactive foreign policy keep it from taking the initiative, leaving its diplomatic footprint smaller than its economic weight would suggest. Above all, China has no soft power – its cultural products fail to set global trends like that of the United States. Leia Mais
From the Ruins of Empire. The intellectuals who remade Asia | Pankaj Mishra
Japan’s military victory over Russia in 1905, the first time a non-Western army had beaten a traditional Western power, sent shock waves through the world and energized leading thinkers across Asia. Tagore, Sun Yat-sen, Gandhi, the 16-year old Nehru, the young soldier Mustafa Kemal (who would later become Ataturk) and a schoolboy called Mao Zedong were all ecstatic, dreaming of Asia’s rise. Newborn children were named Togo, in honor of the Japanese Admiral victorious in the Battle of Tsushima. White men, conquerors of the world, were no longer invincible.
This is the opening scene of a new book by Pankaj Mishra, author of Temptations of the West (reviewed here). In From the Ruins of Empire, he writes about how Asian intellectuals thought about the intrusion of the West, which pitted Western modernity against Asian traditions, in order to explain his claim that the central event of the last century was the intellectual and political awakening of Asia. Leia Mais
Third World Protest: Between Home and the World | Rahul Rao
The opening scene of this fascinating book about human rights in the Global South, nationalism (‘home’) and cosmopolitanism (‘the world’) by Rahul Rao, Lecturer in Politics at SOAS, is central London in 2003. The author participates in a manifestation against the impending Iraq War, seen by many as an imperialist venture that will most certainly endanger Iraqi civilians. Yet he also professes to the “struck by the tacit alliance between a politically correct Western left, so ashamed of the crimes of Western imperialism that it found itself incapable of denouncing the actions of Third World regimes, and a hyper-defensive Third World mentality […].” After all, as British foreign policy makers pointed out, Saddam Hussein was guilty of the largest chemical weapons attack directed against a civilian-populated area in history, which took place in Halabaja in the late 1980s, at the end of the war against Iran.
Both sides may care about the fate of the Iraqi population. Yet, what sets the two groups apart, Rao remarks, is that they have identified different enemies: Communitarians and nationalists pointed to the international system as the main threat, while cosmopolitans point to the state, or, more specifically, to the often brutal ‘Third World state’. Leia Mais
India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect | Sumit Ganguly
In this stimulating collection of scholarly essays, edited by Sumit Ganguly, the fifteen authors provide a balanced and insightful overview over India’s foreign policy. In Chapter 1, Ganguly argues that systemic (e.g., the Cold War), national (e.g., the experience of colonialism) and personal factors (e.g., Nehru) have contributed to the country’s foreign relations. It is this concept of three levels that structures the chapters in the book, helping the reader to navigate through often unwieldy and often unfamiliar issues.
In Chapter 2, Basrur analyzes India-Pakistan relations, arguing that domestic politics pose the major obstacles to finding a lasting resolution. However, he strikes an optimistic tone arguing that through increased cooperation and communication, the Line of Control (LoC) could be “transcended”, and that we can expect cumulative improvement rather than a dramatic and unexpected peace deal. In Chapter 3 on India-Sri Lanka relations, Devotta shows that New Delhi’s concerns about security have outweighed Tamil Nadu’s particular preferences when dealing with the war-torn island to the South of India. The chapter is full of important details -e.g. mentioning China’s growing presence in Sri Lanka – but t is unclear to the reader why this chapter is considerably longer and more detailed than the previous one, particularly since Pakistan plays a much more important role than Sri Lanka. In Chapter 4, Thakar sheds light on India-Bangladesh ties, arguing that despite no obvious obstacles relations are difficult mainly because of structural asymmetries and the suspicions that result from this unequal relationship. Recurring domestic instability on both sides further complicated matters. In Chapter 5, Garver elegantly summarizes the history of India-China relations in the context of shifting alliances during the Cold War, describing, among other aspects, the important role the Soviet Union played as one of India’s most reliable allies and a counterweight against the Pakistan – China alliance starting in the 1960s. Chapter 6 on India- Southeast Asia relations shows how difficult it has been in the past for India to exert influence in the region given its low economic integration due to its autarkic model. Despite these limitations, worries about Indian hegemony in the region have surfaced numerous times in the past decades. Leia Mais
New Powers: How to be come one and how to manage them | Amrita Narlikar
Dr. Amrita Narlikar, who teaches International Politics at Cambridge University, has written a very short and elegant book about Brazil’s, India’s and China’s rise. The topic of emerging powers invites, quite naturally, a lot of forward-looking analysis. The now famous paper “Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050”, published by Goldman Sachs in 2003, offers a seemingly unending number of fascinating discussions, all based on the question of how the world will look like when the five greatest economies are, in that order, China, the United States, India, Japan and Brazil. Will rising powers integrate into today’s world order, or will they overthrow the current system?
Yet Dr. Narlikar resists the temptation of participating in the guessing game and takes a sober look into the past, analyzing India’s, China’s and Brazil’s international negotiation strategies to answer the question mentioned above. She argues that “at one extreme, we may expect the new power to show complete socialisation. At the other extreme, however, we may also see the new power using its newfound status to pursue alternative visions of world order.” This issue already matters greatly today, for Narlikar rightly contends that today’s rising powers, while not yet well-integrated into international institutions, have acquired the de facto status os veto players “whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo.” This has important implications for the stability of today’s world order. If rising powers fail to assume global responsibility, established powers such as the United States may soon no longer be able to provide the global public goods that define today’s global order. Leia Mais
Howto Run the World: Charting a Course to the next Renaissance | Parag Khanna
In his new book, Parag Khanna, Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation and author of “The Second World”, seeks to answer how we can deal with global challenges in a more effective way in the years to come. In merely 214 pages, Khanna covers a vast array of challenges – from climate change, nuclear proliferation, poverty, human rights to the Middle East Conflict to the disputes in Kashmir, Iran and Afghanistan. As a natural consequence, some of his analyses seem a bit rushed (for example, his thoughts on nuclear proliferation are limited to just a few pages). Yet Khanna’s aim is not to engage in profound historical analysis; rather, the book can be understood as a smart brainstorming session on how to tackle the world’s most urgent problems. Academics will frown at his approach as Khanna’s assertions are not based on empirical research, yet he is certainly courageous for approaching big issues in a sweeping way.
Similar to Khanna’s previous book, How to Run the World is well-written, and a lot of his ideas are interesting and seem worth further consideration. For example, Khanna argues that aside from combating Somali pirates, more needs to be done to reduce illegal fishing in the region, which has led to the problem in the first place. In addition, instead of imposing futile sanctions against Iran, he advocated “flooding” the country with “contacts through commerce, media, and diplomatic channels that would force greater transparency on all its activities.” The author is also right to point out that private sector actors will undoubtedly play a key role in global governance, although his prediction that large corporations will soon issue their own passports for employees, with pre-negiotiated visa-free access to countries, seems exaggerated. Leia Mais